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Gentile: The Effect of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act's Wit

THE EFFECT OF THE MULTIEMPLOYER
PENSION PLAN AMENDMENTS ACT'S
WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY RULES ON
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIPS
AND PENSION ADMINISTRATION
Carolyn Diane Gentile*
INTRODUCTION

Concern over the financial stability and continued operation of
multiemployer pension plans led Congress to enact the Multiemployer
Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (hereinafter referred to as
MPPAA, or the Act).' This legislation amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) insofar as it applied to
multiemployer pension plans.2 According to Congress, the policy of
MPPAA was to "alleviate problems which tend to discourage the maintenance and growth of multiemployer pension plans, to provide reasonable protection for the interests of participants and beneficiaries of financially distressed multiemployer pension plans, and to provide a financially
self-sufficient program for the guarantee of employee benefits under
multiemployer plans." 3 In line with these objectives, the Act contains
provisions applicable to multiemployer plans in the areas of funding,
mergers and transfers, reorganization, plan insurance and guaranteed
benefit levels.4 However, of all the significant changes initiated by
MPPAA, the provisions that have generated greatest concern in the

business community are its withdrawal liability rules.5 In short, the Act
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1. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364,94 Stat.
1208 (1980) [(codified at §3, 29 U.S.C. §1001a) (Supp. IV 1980)].
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
[(codified at §2, 29 U.S.C. §1001) (1976 and Supp. IV 1980)].
3. §3(c), 29 U.S.C. §1001a(c).
4. An in-depth discussion of each provision of MPPAA is beyond the scope of this article.
For such a discussion, see Curtis, Multiemployer Plan Amendments Act of 1980: Panaceaor
Poison, 6 JOURNAL OF PENSION PLANNING AND COMPLIANCE 419 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1982, at 30 col. 2.
251
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requires that employers withdrawing from a multiemployer pension plan
continue to fund a portion of the plan's unfunded liabilities. 6
Prior to the enactment of MPPAA, an employer who left the
industry generally incurred no liability if the withdrawal occurred more
than five years before the date of the plan's termination. 7 If an employer
withdrew during this five year period, liability was limited to thirty
percent of the employer's net worth.8 In effect, the employer liability
provisions contained in ERISA tended to encourage withdrawal from
multiemployer plans, particularly in declining industries in which the
contribution base was shrinking, and the plan's liabilities were high. In
addition, the thirty percent liability limit in the case of termination
would frequently be far less than the employer's true liability to the
plan.9
Because of ERISA's shortcomings, MPPAA amended the statute
to provide that a withdrawing employer would be required to continue
funding a portion of the plan's unfunded vested benefits in all cases
except those falling specifically within the statute's exceptions. 0 Under MPPAA,
both the value of a plan's assets and liabilities play a role in determining
a plan's net unfunded vested benefits. A proportionate share of the plan's
accrued vested benefits constitutes an individual employer's "withdrawal
liability."''
Since the value of a plan's total assets and its total liabilities for
benefits are essential components in the determination of an employer's
withdrawal liability, more attention has been focused on them. However,
the value of a plan's assets and liabilities is influenced by several factors.
In many industries, management and union representatives agree during
collective bargaining negotiations to a contribution rate rather than to
6. §4201(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1381(b)(I).
7. §4062(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1362(a)(1). Prior to MPPAA, if an employer was determined
to be a substantial employer as defined by ERISA, the employer was required to post a bond
which would be held by the plan for 5 years. If a termination of the plan would not occur within
that 5 year period, the bond would be surrendered to the employer. See, § 4063, 29 U.S.C. §
1363.
8. Id. at (b)(2), 29 U.S.C. §1362(b)(2).
9. See Curtis supra note 4, at 422.
10. See, e.g., §4209, 29 U.S.C. 1389, (Deminimis Rule); §4245, 29 U.S.C. 1405, (limitation
on withdrawal liability); §4203(b)(1) and (c)(1), 29 U.S.C. 1383(b)(1) and (c)(1) (Special
definition of "withdrawal" for employers in the building and construction industry and the
entertainment industry).
11. §4201(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1381(b)(1). Withdrawal liability applies to both "complete"
and "partial" withdrawals. §4203, 29 U.S.C. § 1383 provides in pertinent part: ".... a complete
withdrawal occurs when an employer (1) permanently ceases to have an obligation to contribute
under the plan, or (2) permanently ceases all operations under the plan." §4203, 29 U.S.C. § 1385
states "... . there is a partial withdrawal by an employer from a plan on the last day of a plan
year if for such plan year-(l) there is a 70 percent contribution decline, or (2) there is a partial
cessation of the employer's contribution obligation."
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the amount of benefits to be provided to plan participants. The plan
trustees, authorized by a trust agreement, set benefit levels based on the
contribution rate negotiated. Therefore, the value of a plan's unfunded
vested benefits is determined by the benefit levels that have been set by
the trustees, and any decisions they may make with respect to a benefit
increase can increase the value of those unfunded vested benefits.
On the other hand, the value of a plan's assets are more susceptible
2
to outside influences, including fluctuations in the marketplace.' The
trustees' ability to invest in high quality securities and other investment
media, as well as to obtain a high return on those investments, plays an
important role in determining the ultimate value of plan assets.
Because of these relationships, MPPAA's creation of withdrawal
liability has resulted in a significant rise in employer inquiries about the
3
financial condition of multiemployer benefit plans.' Employers have
recognized that a limitation on the plan's unfunded liabilities, and as a
consequence on employer's withdrawal liability, may be achieved through
tighter controls over a plan's benefit and/or asset levels. Therefore, one
can anticipate that employers will seek to obtain more input into both
the setting of benefit levels, whether during the term of the collective
agreement or at contract negotiations, and also into the investment
decisions of plan Trustees.
This paper will examine MPPAA, specifically its withdrawal liability provisions and its impact on existing institutions, with emphasis on
pension plan administration and collective bargaining relationships.
While the Act is relatively young, and its full impact is yet to be determined, there are strong indications that the withdrawal liability rules
have caused many employers to be seriously concerned about the
financial burdens that may have to be borne by them if they continue
their participation in multiemployer plans. Companies, thus, are seeking
a more active role in determining issues which traditionally had been
considered trust administration issues, and they have voiced their
demands for more active involvement in the plans at the collective
bargaining table, as well as during the term of the labor agreement.
Role of the Trustees
Section 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management-Relations Act of
194714 permits employers and unions to create employer-financed trust
12. Outside influence effecting the level of plan assets include: inflation, recession, stock
market and interest rate fluctuations.
13. But see PENSION REP. (BNA) (hereinafter referred to as BPR) No. 416 at 1472 (Oct.
wherein it is stated that benefits of the Act include "... development of improved
1982),
25,
data on the part of many plans, tightened plan documentation and administration, strengthened
contribution, collection, and policing activities, and improved funding schedules."
14. 29 U.S.C. §186(c).
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funds for the benefit of employees. The statute requires that such trust
funds be jointly administered with equal trustee representation on behalf
of the employees and the employers. In addition, the assets of the funds
are to be administered "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees ... and their families and dependents... ."15 This same concept was
included in the fiduciary standards set forth in ERISA. There, a fiduciary must "discharge his duty ... solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries" of the plan, 16 and for the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to plan participantsl7 and defraying reasonable
administrative costs.' 8
The LMRA's requirements of joint administration raised unavoidable questions as to the duties and responsibilities owed by the trustees
to the parties appointing them. The Supreme Court, in 1981, addressed
those issues in NLRB v. Amax Coal Co.19
A dispute between Amax and the United Mine Workers arose
because the Company, which employed UMW members in its Wyoming
coal mine, refused to join a multiemployer bargaining unit. When the
mine opened in 1972, the Company signed an agreement with the union
which mirrored the national contract and provided for contributions to
the national trust funds. The Company did not participate in the selection of the national funds' Trustees. Upon expiration of the contract in
1975, Amax refused to join a new multiemployer bargaining unit and,
instead, proposed to establish its own pension and welfare benefit plans.
The UMW claimed that Amax should continue to contribute to the
national trust funds for the benefit of its Wyoming mine employees. As a
result of this dispute, the UMW struck Amax's Wyoming mine.
The Company argued that the employer Trustees on the national
trust fund board were employer representatives, and as such, the union
violated §8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act 20 by coercing
the Company to bargain through collective bargaining representatives it
did not select. The NLRB held that the union had acted lawfully by
striking to force the Company to participate in the plan, and stated that
"while the trustee of a joint trust fund, though he may appropriately
consider the recommendations of the party who appoints him, is a
15. 29 U.S.C. §186(c)(5).
16. §404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1104.
17. §404(a)(l)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. §1 104(a)(1)(A)(i).
18. §404(a)(1)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. §1 104(a)(l)(A)(ii).
19. 453 U.S. 322 (1981).
20. 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(1)(B) (1976). This section provides in pertinent part: "It shall
be an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents (I) to restrain or coerce
... (B) an
employer in the selection of his representative for purposes of collective bargaining
or the
adjustment of grievances."
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fiduciary owing undivided loyalty to the interest of the beneficiaries in
administering the fund." 21
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the Board's
ruling and concluded that the union violated §8(b)(1)(B). The Court held
that management Trustees are not only fiduciaries of the employee
beneficiaries, but also agents of the appointing employers. The Trustees,
"insofar as is consistent with their fiduciary obligations, are expected to
administer the trusts in such a way as to advance the employer's
interests. ' 2
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit, and determined
that the national's management Trustees were not collective bargaining
representatives of the employers who appointed them. In reaching its
conclusion, the Court reviewed §302(c)(5) of the LMRA and §404 of
ERISA and stated that "the statutes defining the duties of a management-appointed Trustee make it virtually self-evident that welfare fund
Trustees are not representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining
3
or the adjustment of grievances within the meaning of §8(b)(1)(B)."2
The Court noted that "the duty of the management-appointed trustee of an employee benefit fund under §302(c)(5) is directly antithetical
to that of an agent of the appointing party."24 And, "the fiduciary requirements of ERISA specifically insulate the trust from the employer's
interest. ' 2 5 Thus, under the law as defined by Amax Coal,plan trustees
do not function as representatives of the party appointing them, but
rather as fiduciaries with respect to the plan. Their loyalties must be
directed solely towards the plan's participants and beneficiaries, and the
decision-making process should be free from the influence of the
collective bargaining process. However, since the withdrawal liability
provisions of MPPAA tie most benefit increases to additional liabilities
for employers participating in a multiemployer plan, the question arises
whether Amax precludes an employer trustee from considering an
increase in withdrawal liability when setting benefit levels.
Congress did not perceive this potential for divided loyalties as a
serious problem. In fact, ERISA specifically permits individuals to serve
as §302 trustees "in addition to being an officer, employee, agent or other
26
representative" of a union or an employer organization.

21. 453 U.S. at 327, 328.
22. Id. at 328.
23. Id. at 334.
24. Id. at 331,332.
25. Id. at 333.
26. §408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. §1 108(c)(3). See also National Union of Hospital and Health
Care Employees, 248 NLRB 631,103 L.R.R.M. 1459 (1980).
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Since the enactment of MPPAA, however, disputes between
trustees have become more common as employer-selected trustees
oppose benefit increases in an effort to limit the plan's unfunded vested
benefits and, consequently, potential employer withdrawal liabilities.
Because plan trustees can create additional liabilities, contributing
employers expressed concern prior to the passage of the Act that it
would foster the agency-type relationship subsequently denounced by
the Court in Amax Coal 27 These conflicts caused deadlocks between
employer and union trustees over proposed benefit levels. 28
Such a deadlock prompted arbitration in the matter of Bay Area
Painters Pension Trust Fund29 when a pension benefit increase was
opposed by the management Trustees on the basis that it would create an
additional $625,000 in unfuxided vested liabilities. The management
Trustees argued that the proposal would render the pension plan less
sound and create additional liabilities on employers which were not
agreed to, citing the withdrawal liability provisions of MPPAA.30 On the
contrary, the union Trustees asserted that the increase would be prudent;
consistent with the Trustees' duty to act in the sole interest of the plan
participants and beneficiaries, and would not put the trust in any danger
of insolvency.
In ruling in favor of the union Trustees, the arbitrator stated: "The
purpose of the pension trust is to provide as much benefit to the
participants as is possible with the contributions and assets available."3 1
The decision rejected the claim that the benefit increase would render the
plan less sound: "It is not the function of the Trust to achieve the
maximum soundness possible, but instead, it is the function of the Trust
to pay the greatest amounts of benefits possible within the framework of
reasonable soundness." 32 The arbitrator noted that withdrawal liability
had no place in a funding policy discussion insofar as it limited the
employer from "going non-union or from selling his business for as

much as he feels it is worth.

.

...

33

However, the terms of the decision do not bar Trustees from
consideration of withdrawal liability. "If in the opinion of the trustees or
27. See, e.g., ABA-Conference Report, Pension Plan Termination Insurance-Quo
Vadis? (September 19-21, 1979) discussing Sheet Metal Workers International and Edward J.
Carlough (Central Florida Sheetmetal Contractors Association, Inc.) 234 NLRB No. 16Z
28. Pursuant to the LMRA §302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. §186(c)(5), such deadlocks among plan
trustees must be settled through arbitration by a neutral umpire.
29. 2 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT CASES (BNA) (hereinafter referred to as EBC), No. 2 at 1724

(1981).
30.
31.
32
33.

See BPR No. 353, at A-12, (Aug. 3, 1981).
2 EBC at 1734.
Id.
Id.
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their advisors, the withdrawal liability of employers has some impact on
the ability of the Trust to meet its obligations to the participants and the
beneficiaries, then withdrawal liability ought to be considered. 3 4 The
decision concludes by suggesting that the question of withdrawal liability
is a matter for negotiation. "If the employers want control over the
creation of unfunded vested liability, then they must exercise this desire
35
at the collective bargaining table."
Since the management Trustees' in Bay Area Paintersattempted to
"represent" their appointing employers when setting benefit levels, the
arbitrator followed the Supreme Court's ruling in Amax Coalby emphasizing that plan trustees must conduct their activities for the benefit of
plan participants and not as representatives of their appointing employers. According to the arbitrator, if the employer wishes to control the
creation of unfunded liabilities, it must be done at the bargaining table
rather than during the term of the agreement.
The combination of MPPAA and Amax Coalhave caused some to
suggest that employer trustees will follow the same strategy as that
advanced in the Bay Area case. 36 Subsequent events lend support to that
conclusion. For example, in Borden Inc. v. United Dairy Workers
Pension Program37 Borden sought to enjoin the Pension Fund Committee from increasing benefits and, consequently, the unfunded liability of
the plan. The terms of the collective bargaining agreement, established
prior to the enactment of MPPAA, required a certain contribution rate
from signatory employers. The employer argued that MPPAA altered its
obligation under the collective bargaining agreement and a benefits
improvement would result in "substantial unbargained for liability on its
part." In effect, the employer sought to enjoin the benefit increase until it
had the opportunity to bargain with the union over the increase.
The court ruled in favor of the employer, and held that MPPAA
imposed unbargained for liability on the employer which was not
contemplated by the parties during negotiations. Accordingly, the court
stated that the fully funded status of the plan should not be altered:
"Having achieved this position the court believes it should be impermissible for the committee to 'regress' the status of the fund when to do so
would impose unbargained for liability on the employer-plaintiff."38 The
court noted that it was not enjoining the proposed increase because it
would result in an increase in the plan's unfunded status. Rather, the
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1735.
36. Vesley, Boisseau, and Curtis, Multiemployer Pension Plan Liability: Amax Coaland
Beyond, 7 JOURNAL OF PENSION PLANNING AND COMPLIANCE 350 (1981).
37.

517 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. Mich. 1981), 2 EBC 1625.

38.

Id. at 1166,2 EBC at 1628.
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decision "simply stands for the proposition that such a change in status
should be effected only after the employer has agreed to it, in light of the
September 1980 ERISA amendments." 39
The Borden case did not involve a trustee deadlock; instead, the
employer protested an existing benefit increase, and the court permitted
the employer to exercise direct control over the plan's unfunded liability
absent further negotiations. In effect, the court refused to uphold the
Trustees' authority to set benefit levels. More importantly, Borden
provides evidence that courts may favor the collective bargaining forum
in order to address the question of whether plan trustees can increase
benefits and, thus, the employer's potential withdrawal liability, postMPPAA.
Returning to the arbitral forum, a recent arbitration award considered the impact a benefit increase would have on an employer's withdrawal liability. In North Texas CarpentersPension Plan,40 the arbitrator
rejected the union Trustees' proposal which would have resulted in a $5.3
million increase in the plan's unfunded vested liability. The award cited
several factors, including the
impact of the size of the increase in unfunded past service liability,
the effect the increases would have on employer withdrawal liability
...the Borden decision, and the phrase in the Bay Area case that
reads . . .'review the impact of the proposal and decide whether it
hurts the trust more than it helps the beneficiaries.' 41
A similar result was reached in Brick Masons' Pension Trust
Fund,42 but in this case the dispute between the union and management
Trustees arose over which benefit increase proposal to implement. The
union asserted that the employer's approach "would limit participation
in the benefits to future-Future service beneficiaries only" while their
plan "would permit all participants to participate in improved benefits. '43 Further, the union argued that the employer's concern over unfunded liabilities should not enter into a benefit decision. Citing Amax
Coal and Bay Area Painters,the union claimed that the Trustees are to
act "with no allegiance to any body, but to what they perceive as the best
interests of their particular Fund's beneficiaries." 44 The employer pointed
to the sharp drop in employment in the industry as well as MPPAA's
withdrawal liability provisions. 45
39. Id. at 1167,2 EBC at 1629.
40. 2 EBC 2313 (1981).
41. Id. at 2321, 2322. See also BPR No.376, at 80 (January 18, 1982).
42 3 EBC 1345 (1982).
43. Id. at 1347.
44. Id. at 1348.
45. Id. at 1348, 1349.
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The arbitrator ruled in favor of the proposal preferred by the management Trustees. In regard to the employer's concern over unfunded liabilities, he stated: ".. . unfunded vested liability is and must [original
emphasis] be a part of the considerations by any Trustee member of a
Fund. The reasonableness with which the members act is reflected in
part by the prudence of their decision." 46 The arbitrator distinguished the
Bay Area decision, insofar as the arbitrator in that case was not presented with benefit improvement options or a depressed industry. He
rejected the union's reliance on Amax Coal, declaring that Trustee independence does not include a disregard of economic and industrial
47
conditions.
The Brick Masons' case presents a situation in which the employer
trustees' consideration of withdrawal liability is consistent with their
fiduciary obligations. Their concern about the impact of the benefit
increase on unfunded liabilities was not indicative of an attempt to
protect the interests of the companies that appointed them. Instead, the
decision supports the view that the effects of a benefit increase on the
plan's liabilities must be the subject of inquiry. The financial condition of
the fund, together with the economic conditions of the industry in
question, can make an increase in accrued vested benefit liability a
legitimate trustee concern. Although the employer trustees' decisions
concerning benefit levels may be motivated by MPPAA's imposition of
financial burdens on employers, their actions may not necessarily be
contrary to the Amax Coaldecision.
In that context, it must be emphasized that the issue in Amax Coal
was "whether the employer-selected trustees of a trust fund created
under §302(c)(5) are 'representatives' of the employer 'for the purposes of
collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances' within the meaning
of§8(b)(1)(B)." 48 While the court used strong language to emphasize that
trustees are not representatives of their appointing parties, it was not
presented with the question of whether the employer-selected Trustees'
objection to benefit increases because of their impact on employer withdrawal liability is a violation of their fiduciary duties. According to the
results in the above cited court and arbitration awards, trustee inquiries
into any projected increase in a plan's unfunded liabilities when setting
benefits is not a breach of their fiduciary duties. 49 It may well be a breach
46. Id. at 1350.
47. Id. "The court's emphasis in Amax is not, in my opinion, contraindicative to the
honest, open, reasonable, and prudent position taken by those on this Fund Board who
supported Plan A."
48. 453 U.S. at 325.
49. See Peick v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 539 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ill.,
1982), 3 EBC 1377. In this case MPPAA withstood a constitutional challenge. On the issue of
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of fiduciary duty to ignore the impact of such changes. However, when
the sole consideration in making a decision on benefit changes is its
effect on withdrawal liability, then a determination of the trustees'
compliance with their fiduciary duties is more problematic. Nevertheless,
mere opposition to a benefit increase alone does not establish that an
employer-trustee is acting as a management representative in disregard
of his fiduciary obligations.
While courts and arbitrators have, at times, looked favorably upon
the employer trustees' concern about withdrawal liability, it is clear that
this sensitivity became particularly acute after the enactment of MPPAA.
Whatever the justification proffered for setting limits on what historically would have been routine benefit increases, the conclusion is
inescapable that MPPAA is greatly effecting the collective bargaining
process. Since employee pension benefits arose from collective bargaining, the trustees cannot, regardless of legal principles, be totally insulated
from the collective bargaining process. Employer-selected trustees, to
some extent necessarily, must guard the employers' financial interests.
The real issue is one of degree.
This reality of labor-management relations appears to comport
with Justice Stevens' statement in his Amax Coal dissent:
The Trustees of employee benefit funds often exercise broad discretion on policy matters with respect to which management and labor
representatives may reasonably have different views ... Nothing in

the statutes or the legislative history suggests that difference along
labor-management lines are in any way inconsistent with the Trustees' fiduciary duties to trust beneficiaries.5 0

Investment Decisions
As the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, MPPAA has
heightened management's interest and involvement in the, setting of
benefit levels. Further, the Act has caused employers to inquire into the
investment performance of the plan. Because the level of plan assets
affects the unfunded vested benefits of the plan, and hence withdrawal
liability, employers may attempt to monitor more closely the trustees'
ability to obtain high quality investments as well as to secure a high
return on those investments.
Management's desire to scrutinize more carefully the plan's investment performance may create a further conflict between union and
trustee independence, the court stated: "It is not true, therefore, that the Trustees are completely
barred from considering the impact of their actions on the employer's withdrawal liability.
Actual consideration of these interests is, moreover, likely, given management's statutory right
to select half of the trustees." Id. at 1048, 3 EBC at 1396.
50. 453 U.S. at 344.
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employer trustees as well as among the bargaining parties. For example,
union representatives may advocate social investments and the utilization of plan assets to protect the job security of participants. Employers,
in order to limit their potential withdrawal liability, will be more
concerned with obtaining the maximum rate of return available on the
plan's investments.
The investment goals of both union and management representatives however, are limited and ultimately defined in ERISA's fiduciary
requirements which impose a duty upon trustees to preserve and to
augment plan assets through sound investments for the sole and exclu5
sive benefit of the participants. '
The prudence rule contained in §404(a)(1)(B) of ERISA requires
that fiduciaries act "with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims." 52 Diversification of
plan investments also is mandated unless clearly it is not prudent to do
so. 53
Since the statutory standards were general in their terms, and clarification was thought to be desirable, the Department of Labor issued
regulations which attempt to further define and clarify the "prudence
standard." The regulation states that the prudence standard is met if the
fiduciary gives "appropriate consideration of those facts and circumstances, that, given the scope of such fiduciaries' investment duties," he
knows or should know are relevant, including the role that such
plays in the portfolio over
investment or investment course of action
54
duties.
investment
has
fiduciary
the
which
Although an increasing number of cases have been initiated which
pose the issue of whether the fiduciaries of multiemployer plans acted in
accordance with ERISA's prudence standard, MPPAA's impact on the
decisions of plan fiduciaries remains an open question. Nevertheless,
recent case law provides some guidance concerning the meaning of
ERISA's requirements, and is useful in an analysis of the present limits
on trustee investment decisions.
In Donovan v. Mazzola,55 the Trustees of a Pension Trust Fund
were found to have breached their fiduciary duties by making an
additional $1.5 million loan to the local union's convalescent fund and
51.
52
53.
54.
(1979).
55.

§404(a)(I), 29 U.S.C. §1104 (a)(l).
Id.§1 104(a)(l)(B).
Id. §1 104(a)(1)(c).
Rules and Regulations For Fiduciary Responsibility, 29 C.F.R. §2550.404a-l(b)
2 EBC 2115 (1981).
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by extending credit to the fund without taking appropriate steps to
protect the pension plan. Even though there was a substantial risk of
default, the loan was made at below prevailing interest rates for comparable mortgages at that time.
The Trustees also were found to have acted imprudently in
approving a $650,000 loan to a limited partnership because they did not
attempt to obtain necessary and relevant information concerning the
loan. Finally, the Trustees were found to have violated ERISA's diversity
requirement because there was too much concentration on mortgages in
one area. The court, accordingly, ordered the appointment of an
investment manager, the repayment by the Trustees of $369,500 and the
posting of a $1 million bond as security for any contingent claims that
may arise. 56
In a similar matter, the Department of Labor, in Marshall v.
Glazier's Pension Plan,57 sought a preliminary injunction barring the
Trustees of a pension plan from committing 23% of its assets for a loan
to a land development project. The loan, for eighteen months, was to
pay 25% interest. When the court granted the injunction, it found that
the loan violated ERISA's diversification requirements. "Both on its face
and according to the standards of experienced lenders, a commitment of
23% of the Glazier's Pension Plan's total assets to a single loan subjects a
disproportionate amount of the trust assets to the risk of a large
loss."58 The court held that the Trustees had violated the "prudence standard" by failing "to follow the procedures which a prudent lender would
utilize" and not perceiving "the dangers to which they were exposing the
Plan."5 9
The preceding decisions, albeit only those of federal district courts,
illustrate that ERISA's fiduciary standards are being strictly construed.
While the effect MPPAA will have on trustees' investment strategy is yet
to be determined, it is clear that trustee investment decisions must conform to ERISA's fiduciary standards. To date, both the Department of
Labor and the courts have narrowly construed ERISA's §404, thus
limiting the trustees to those investments which provide the maximum
rate of economic return regardless of other considerations, such as social
.utility or the creation of employment. Given the positions taken in
applying ERISA, increased employer scrutiny of investment performance brought about by MPPAA will add further impetus to an already
growing reluctance of trustees to invest in anything other than tradi56. Id. at 2133-37.
57. 507 F. Supp. 378 (D. Hawaii 1980), 2 EBC 1006.
58. Id. at 384,2 EBC at 1011.
59. Id. at384,2 EBCat 1012
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tional, conservative investment media. It is possible that where the trustees' performance, although prudent, fails to satisfy the employers,
demands will be made that investment policy be decided at the collective
bargaining table.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS

Benefit Levels
The frequent occurrences of trustee deadlocks over the question of
benefit increases exemplifies one of MPPAA's effects. Not surprisingly,
arbitrators and judges favor the collective bargaining process as the best
method for settling disagreements regarding appropriate levels of benefit
and plan liabilities. If the parties choose to control the amount of
unfunded liabilities during negotiations, the problem of Trustee deadlocks probably will diminish.
At a subsequent round of collective bargaining, employers can insist
that restrictions upon trustee behavior be written into the actual
contract and declaration of trust establishing their plan. They can
bargain for language forbidding future benefit improvements which
increase the plan's unfunded vested liability by more than a set
amount or percentage. 60
Resolution of such problems through collective bargaining is a
keystone of American labor law. Section 1 of the NLRA states that the
policy of the United States is to be carried out by "encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining ...' Historically, the
ability of the collective bargaining process to adapt to resolving
problems in the work place, as well as to varying economic conditions, is
a major reason for the continued viability of labor-management relations. MPPAA, however, is changing collective bargaining negotiations
on a number of fronts. The Act's withdrawal liability provisions seem to
be transferring many of the decisions presently made by plan trustees to
the collective bargaining parties. However, the sheer complexity of
62
benefit issues may create an unworkable situation during negotiations.
Initially, such a radical change in the issues to be determined during
collective bargaining will create a need for substantially more disclosure
of financial information prior to and during the bargaining process. The
practical difficulties in the communication of complex data relating to
benefit costs, unfunded liability, actuarial assumptions, etc., from the
60.
at 1396,
61.
62.

1982), 3 EBC
Peick v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 539 F. Supp. at 1049 (N.D. I11.
1397.
24U.S.C.§151.
See Vesely, Boisseau, and Curtis, supra note 32 at 363.
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trustees to the bargaining parties are staggering, and dealing with these
matters may prove burdensome for negotiators. In fact, union and management representatives may be forced to rearrange priorities regarding
subjects of bargaining, and certainly the process will be more protracted.
If the parties do manage to settle all benefit issues during negotiations,
they may find that they have taken on the status of fiduciaries because
their decisions with respect to benefit levels will directly affect plan
participants and the assets of the fund. In the alternative, considering the
inconvenience and difficulties of coping with these issues during negotiations, the employer simply may refuse to provide any new money until
the plan's unfunded liabilities are eliminated.
Indeed, the response to recent benefit proposals have reflected the
employer's desire to maintain only existing benefit levels in order to
prevent the creation of further unfunded liabilities. For example, the
association representing California Grocers has asserted that monies
should not be allocated to improving pension benefits before unfunded
vested liabilities are substantially eliminated.63 This potential effect of
MPPAA was anticipated by Congress. During the Senate debate over
the enactment of MPPAA, it was suggested that the "imposition of
withdrawal liability will, of itself, cause employers to demand that
benefit levels be a subject of bargaining."6 4
Further impetus for increased party involvement in determining
benefits is found in UnitedMine Workers v. Robinson.65 In Robinson,
the parties had set the level of benefits paid by an employee benefit fund
in the collective bargaining agreement. The issue faced by the Court was
the legality under section 302(c)(5) of allegedly unreasonable discrimination between two classes of widow-beneficiaries by a multiemployer
benefit fund established by the United Mine Workers of America and
the National Coal Miners Operators Association. Based on trustee
resolutions, a widow of a retired miner who was receiving a pension at
the time of his death, was entitled to a death benefit of $2,000 payable
over a two year period. On the other hand, a widow of a miner who was
eligible for a pension, but was still working at the time of his death, was
entitled to a $5,000 death benefit over a five year period. A second
resolution provided for health care coverage for such widows for the
same time periods.
In 1974, the UMW and the Operators agreed to restructure the
benefit program to provide that the level of benefits, the eligibility
63. Multiemployer Pension Plan Stabilization Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1748 Before
the Subcommittee on Labor and Human Resources,97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 99 (1982) (statement
of Don Gardiner employer-representative).
64. 126 CONG. REC. S 10103 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (statement of Sen. Dole).
65. 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
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requirements, and the rate of contributions would be established at the
collective bargaining table. The parties also agreed to replace the original
1950 fund with the "1955 Benefit Trust" and the "1974 Benefit Trust,"
both of which provided for health and death benefits.
During the 1974 negotiations, the union demanded that widows
receiving health benefits for two or five years under the old plan receive
lifetime health coverage. The Operators agreed to this demand, insofar
as it related to widows of miners whose death occurred after the contract
became effective, but they objected to the increase in benefits for widows
whose miner husbands had already died. The final agreement included a
provision of health care coverage for widows of miners whose death
predated the contract, with the exception of those widows of miners who
had been working at the time of their death, but who were eligible for
pensions. Those widows who were denied lifetime health coverage under
the 1974 arrangement sued and claimed that the decision excluding them
was arbitrary and capricious in that it had no rational relationship to the
purposes of the trust. Thus, it was alleged that a violation of §302 of the
LMRA had been committed.
The District Court rejected the widows' claims and held that the
"trustees are bound to adhere to the terms of the agreement."6 6 The
Court of Appeals reversed and held that the "requirement in §302(c)(5)
...means that eligibility rules fixed by a collective bargaining agreement must meet a reasonableness test. '67 The court was unable to find a
satisfactory explanation for the different treatment of widows. The
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that §302(c)(5)
does not authorize the federal courts to review the reasonableness of
collective bargaining provisions. It stated that the plain meaning of §302
"is simply that employer contributions to employee benefit trust funds
must accrue to the benefit of employees and their families and dependents, to the exclusion of all others."6 8 There is nothing in the statute
that imposes "any restriction on the allocation of the funds among the
persons protected by §302(c)(5)."6 9
Unlike other cases challenging the actions of trustees, Robinson did
not present a situation in which the courts had the authority to review
trustees' compliance with their fiduciary duties and to correct any
arbitrary and capricious actions. The Court emphasized that trustees
were not given full authority to determine eligibility requirements.
Rather, the trust agreement was amended to give the collective bargain66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 569.
Id. at 570.
Id.
Id. at 572.
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ing parties authority over eligibility standards. The Court concluded that
"[a]bsent conflict with federal law, then, the trustees breached no
fiduciary duties in administering the 1950 Benefit Trust in accordance
with the terms established in the 1974 collective bargaining agreement." 70
Given that because of MPPAA, management is seeking control of
benefit levels through negotiations, Robinson provides an additional
impetus to that principle; i.e., the federal courts cannot review the bargaining parties' determination of benefits under §302.
Even if the parties do not wish to become involved in fixing benefit
levels, employers may resist union attempts to raise contribution rates,
recognizing that the next step may result in a proposal to raise benefits,
and thus increase unfunded liabilities. If the parties do fix benefits at the
bargaining table, unions may find that concessions must be made in
other areas in order to improve benefit levels. It is likely that these
differences over benefit levels will lead to heightened tension in the
collective bargaining arena. The conflict which resulted in trustee deadlock now may produce a bargaining stalemate, and unions may be
forced to use economic weapons to force management to concede to a
benefit increase. In Robinson, management acceded to the final benefit
package partially in response to a strike by the UMW. The Supreme
Court recognized in Amax that economic weapons frequently come into
play when parties disagree. In fact, the court distinguished between
trustees and bargaining representatives by noting that strikes and other
economic weapons are appropriate in the collective bargaining arena,
while settlement through arbitration applies to pension administration. 7'
However, the agreement of the bargaining parties may not, of itself,
be dispositive of the issue. Subsequent to the Robinson decision, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that trustees of a multiemployer welfare benefit fund were not bound by a collective bargaining
provision which fixed benefit levels. 72 In Sinai Hospital,five hospitals
which participated in a multiemployer fund sought to enjoin the trustee
from increasing benefits. The trust agreement authorized the trustees to
determine eligibility standards as well as benefit levels for the fund's
participants. During negotiations for their 1980-1982 contract, the
hospitals and the union agreed to a reduction in the percentage
contribution to the fund and to a maintenance of current benefit levels.
The contract was the first in which the union and the hospitals had
agreed to a specific level of benefits.
70. Id. at 574.
71. 453 U.S. 336, 337; see also Botto v. Friedberg, 3 EBC 2534 n.16 (E.D. N.Y. 1982).
72. Sinai Hospital v. Hospital Employees Benefit Fund, 697 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1982), 3
EBC 2417.
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In February, 1981, the fund notified the hospitals that it would not
comply with the collective bargaining provisions which set benefit levels.
The fund asserted its authority to fix benefits by the terms of the trust
agreement and as a matter of law. Accordingly, when the trustees
implemented a benefit increase, the hospitals filed their complaint and
73
application for a temporary injunction in the federal district court
arguing that the trustees' action breached the hospitals' collective
bargaining contracts with the unions. Specifically, the hospitals claimed
that the benefit increase violated provisions of the LMRA, by permitting
an outside party to alter the collective bargaining agreements and
allowing the union to receive more than that which was contained in the
contract.
The hospitals relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson
for the proposition that the parties may control the level of benefits paid
from a trust fund. The District Court ruled against the hospitals and
concluded "that the trustees and the fund were governed by the provisions of the trust agreement and could not be bound by contrary provisions of the subsequent collective bargaining contracts between the hospitals and the union." 74
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. The
court distinguished Robinson on the basis that the trust agreement in
that case had been amended. "The union and the employers in Robinson
in 1974 dismantled the pre-1974 trust funds which had left the benefit
levels to the trustees' discretion, and created new trusts by whose terms
any change in benefit levels required the approval of the employers and
the union. '75 Under the Sinai facts, the court found that the trustees'
obligations to the fund's beneficiaries were based on the terms of the
trust agreement and "it is clear ...that the trustees' May, 1981 action
6
raising benefit levels was consistent with their obligation."7
Sinai Hospital,therefore, illustrates the importance of recognizing
the interaction between the trust agreement and the collective bargaining
contract, and the obligation created by each of these documents. Clearly,
the Sinai Hospitaldecision stands for the proposition that in order to
transfer the trustees' authority over benefit levels to the negotiators, the
trust agreement must be amended. If parties to a collective bargaining
agreement wish to take over functions that were traditionally performed
by plan trustees, they must make this desire evident in the plan's document. Significantly, however, the court in Botto v. Friedberg77 was able
73. Id. at 564, 3 EBC at 2420.
74. 697 F.2d 563, 564, 3 EBC 2419, 2420.
75. Id. at 568, 3 EBC at 2423.
76. Id.
77. 3 EBC 2529.
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to utilize the plan documents to reach a result that is contrary to that of
Sinai Hospital.
In Botto, the Trustees of Plumbers Local No. 457 Pension Trust
Fund deadlocked on the issue of a proposed 17% benefit increase. The
Trust Agreement provided for the appointment of an impartial umpire if
the Trustees failed to agree on "a matter relating to the administration of
the Pension Trust Fund," and it gave the Trustees authority over the
"determination of benefits and the administration of the program."78
The employer Trustees requested summary judgment claiming that the
proposed increase was not a matter of plan administration subject to
arbitration, nor was it a proper question for decision by the Trustees
pursuant to ERISA's fiduciary provisions. Based upon the language of
the Trust Agreement ("determination of benefits and the administration
of the program'), 79 the court stated that the ". . . employer trustees and
the union trustees intended that the determination of benefits be clearly
separate from, and subject to different treatment thah, the day to day
management of the Fund."8 0 Therefore, arbitration over the proposed
increase was improper.
In order to answer the employer Trustees' second argument, the
court reviewed Amax Coal and emphasized the principle that "decisions
to be made in the collective bargaining arena cannot be made by Pension
Fund Trustees." 8' The court stated that it was inappropriate for the
Trustees to consider an increase without a collective bargaining agreement on the subject: ". . . consideration by the trustees of increased
benefits, in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement between the
employer association and the union, placed the employer trustees in the
position of dual loyalty prohibited by the Supreme Court in Amax. ' 82
Consequently, the issue of increased benefits was not a matter for the
Trustees, but rather a subject for the collective bargaining process.8 3
Choice of WithdrawalFormula
Although the Act provides that the trustees must choose either one
of four statutory withdrawal formulas or submit an alternative to the
78. Id. at 2531.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2532.
81. Id. at 2534, citing Amax Coal, 453 U.S. 334.
82. Id.
83. The extent to which MPPAA has changed the dynamics of negotiations with respect
to benefit issues cannot yet be ascertained. However, it is clear that its effect on negotiations has
been the subject of considerable discussion and concern. The Act itself mandates the Secretary
of Labor to ". . . study the feasibility of requiring collective bargaining on both the issues of
contributions to, and benefits from multiemployer plans." §412(b)(1).
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Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation for approval,8 4 the trustees'
decision also may become a subject of collective bargaining because it
will have a substantial impact on the employer contributors to the
pension plan. For example, unless the trustees elect otherwise, the
statutory "Presumptive Method" will apply. Under that formula, employers are divided into two groups. 85 The first group consists of those
employers who contributed to the pension plan for the plan year ending
prior to April 29, 1980, and the second group is composed of those
employers who did not contribute to the plan during that time period.
The withdrawal liability of employers in the first category is based upon
the unfunded vested benefits of the plan for the plan year ending prior to
April 29, 1980, as well as those changes in the plan's unfunded vested
benefits for each year ending on or after April 29, 1980. The withdrawal
liability of the second group of employers is calculated only with respect
to the changes that occur in the plan's unfunded vested benefits for those
years ending on or after April 29, 1980.
The first alternative method 86 is a modified version of the presumptive method described above, and its principal differences are the
combining of the changes in the plan's unfunded vested benefit liabilities
for years after April 29, 1980 and the use of a straight 15 year
amortization schedule for the plan's liabilities for unfunded vested
benefits for the years ending prior to April 29, 1980. The presumptive
method assumes a 5% amortization rate. Like the presumptive method,
however, the employers who contributed to the plan for years ending
prior to April 29, 1980 would be the only employers who have a share of
the plan's unfunded vested benefits for those prior years. Each of these
two methods favors new employers at the expense of older contributors
because new companies will not have to bear any share of the plan's
unfunded vesfed benefits existing for plan years prior to April 29, 1980.
Consequently, their portion of the plan's liabilities is far less than for
employers who contributed to the plan prior to April 29, 1980.
The second alternative method called the "Rolling Five Method"
makes no distinctions among employers. 87 The calculation of an employer's withdrawal liability is based solely upon the employer's share of the
total unfunded vested benefits of the plan as of the date that the
employer withdraws. Since all employers are treated equally, this second
84. §§421 1(a), 421 1(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. §§1391(a), 1391(c)(5).
85. §4211(b), 29 U.S.C. §1391(b).
86. §4211(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. §1391(c)(2).
87. §4211 (c)(3), 29 U.S.C. §1391(c)(3). The plans that adopt the "rolling five" method
may, if they qualify, avail themselves of the "six year free look" that is permitted by §4210 of
M PPAA. This section provides some relief for a new employer provided the withdrawal occurs
within 6 years of the commencement of contributions to the plan.
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alternative method would favor older contributing employers because
newer companies would have to pay a proportionate share of the fund's
liabilities for unfunded vested benefits regardless of the date they
occurred.
The third alternative method, which is probably the most equitable,
is called the "Direct Attribution Method." 88 Pursuant to this formula,
the unfunded vested benefits of the plan that are directly attributable to
the employer's employees are charged to that employer, and, similarly,
the employer receives credit for all of its contributions. As a result, the
plan must maintain separate records showing credits and liabilities for
each employer who contributes to the plan.
The foregoing summary of the alternatives provided by the statute
demonstrates that the choice of a method for the calculation of
withdrawal liability must have an economic impact not only upon
withdrawing employers, but also upon those who remain with the plan.
It is an employer in this latter group who may be required to note its
potential liability to the pension plan on its balance sheets. If this figure
equals or exceeds the company's net worth, there must, for example, be
negative effects on its borrowing capacity.
The plan's trustees, who must determine the choice of formula,
usually represent the larger companies which have participated in the
plan for many years. Predictably, such trustees will prefer those methods
of calculation that will favor their particular employer's interest. On the
other hand, union trustees would favor a formula that would permit it to
attract new contributors-broadening the base of the pension plan.
Because of the divergent points of view between union and employer
trustee groups occasioned by the necessity to choose a withdrawal
liability formula, deadlocks also may arise on this issue. Should such
conflicts be incapable of resolution by the trustees, the choice of a
withdrawal formula possibly may be another subject that is referred to
the parties to be settled during collective bargaining. Thus, further
burdens are added to the process.
ProposalsFor Defined ContributionPlans
Employers who realize that MPPAA's constraints are applicable
only to defined benefit plans may attempt to limit their potential withdrawal liability by bargaining for the formation of defined contribution
plans. Multiemployer plans are typically defined benefit plans which
provide participants with ascertainable pre-established benefits. 89 These
88.
89.

§4211(c)(4), 29 U.S.C. §1391(c)(4).
ERISA §3(35), 29 U.S.C. §1002(35).
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plans are normally funded by contributions made on a negotiated rate
basis. Under a defined benefit plan, even though the contribution rate is
set by contract, the plan has promised the participants something in
excess of the specific contribution rate. Under a defined contribution
plan, however, the ultimate benefit is based entirely upon the actual
contributions contained in an individual employee's account. 90 Therefore, no unfunded vested benefits are created. Accordingly, if an
employer contributes to a defined contribution plan, it avoids any
obligations other than those set forth in its collective bargaining
agreement.
It has been suggested that the withdrawal liability provisions of
MPPAA "could easily result in the ultimate demise of multiemployer
defined benefit plans."9 1 However, the substitution of defined contribu92
tion plans for defined benefit plans is not free of difficulty. A change
from a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan will not
automatically eliminate the pre-existing liability for unfunded vested
benefits of the defined benefit plan.93 Employers must continue to fund
the plan's unfunded vested benefits.
The Act provides that termination of a multiemployer plan occurs
if plan documents are amended for the purposes of forming a defined
contribution plan. 94 When termination of the plan occurs, employers are
obligated to continue contributing to the plan until the fund's liabilities
are eliminated. 95 Therefore, an employer contributing to a plan with
large unfunded vested benefits may be hesitant to bargain for the
formation of a defined contribution plan, if agreement to such a change
would not result in a real or immediate economic gain. Such an
agreement, however, would eliminate the possibility that the unfunded
vested benefit liability would grow. Nevertheless, the creation of a
defined contribution plan would be very beneficial to employers participating in a well funded plan who wish to prevent the creation of future
unfunded vested benefits. Since no liability would be created, it is likely
90. §3(34), 29 U.S.C. §1002(34).
91. Defined Benefit Plan Growth Hit By New Laws, PENSION & INVESTMENT AGE (Nov.
22, 1982) at 60.
92. But see BPR No. 437, at 548, Status of Defined Benefit Plans Discussed During
Senate Panel Hearing, (March 28, 1983). According to Dallas L. Salisbury, executive director
of the Employee Benefit Research Institute ". . . on an annual average, 24.2 percent of new
plans established post-ERISA have been defined benefit plans. Approximately 55 percent of net
new plans established each year were defined benefit plans before ERISA was enacted .... "
93. See Note, Withdrawal Liabilityfor Double-Breasted ConstructionEmployers Under
the Muliemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1389
(1981).
94. §4041A(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §1341A(a)(3).
95. See supra note 93 at 1389; § 4041A(e), 29 U.S.C. §1341A(e).
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that proposals to substitute a defined contribution plan for a defined
benefit plan will be common in such circumstances.
When faced with employer demands to create defined contribution
plans, unions predictably will be opposed because such plans tend to
exaggerate existing differences in their members' interests which can lead
to tension and protest within the union. For example, the establishment
of a defined contribution plan may adversely effect older participants
who will be unable to continue to accrue benefits under the existing plan.
On the contrary, younger workers perceive defined contribution plans as
better serving their needs because these plans maintain separate accounts
for each participant that are usually available to the owner upon
termination, death, disability or retirement. Given this prospect of
fueling divisions within the membership, it is probable that a union's
leadership likely will be unwilling to agree to the creation of a defined
contribution plan, if the principal or only justification for such a
proposal is either the prevention or the lessening of an employer's
withdrawal liability.
Here again, employers are reacting to their concerns resulting from
MPPAA. This issue, in combination with the others previously discussed, can only create added grounds for dissension between the
parties.
INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR BARGAINING

The flow of data from pension plans to the bargaining parties will
take on greater significance during negotiations which deal with MPPAA's
impact on the plan and the contributing employers. Complete discussions of benefit levels will, at a minimum, require communication of
benefit cost and liability information to the bargaining parties. An
employer involved in a multiemployer plan may attempt to obtain
information beyond that which relates to his particular company and its
employees. Under MPPAA, "the fund assesses liability against a withdrawing employer purely on the basis of the arithmetical relationship
between the employer's contribution level and the totalcontributionsby
all employers [emphasis added] over the same period." Thus, "there is no
necessary relationship between the vested benefits attributable to that
employer's former employees and the amount of liability. 9 6 Moreover, a
portion of a plan's unfunded liabilities may not be attributable to any
one employer, as in the case of employer insolvency and the cessation of
contributions. 97
96. Multiemployer Pension Plan StabilizationAct of 1981: Hearings on S.1748 Before
the Subcommittee on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 41 (1982) (statement
of Keith Fulton employer-representative).
97. See§4225, 29 U.S.C. §1405(b).
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Questions also may arise concerning the obligations of the bargaining parties regarding the furnishing of benefit and related data. To what
extent must the employer rely on the union to provide the necessary
information? MPPAA requires the disclosure of certain information
from the plan to the contributing employers. The Act states that upon
the request of an employer, "the plan sponsor [should] make available
...general information necessary for the employer to compute its withdrawal liability with respect to the plan." 98 In addition, the employer
may request that the plan sponsor prepare an estimate of withdrawal
liability or provide information unique to that employer.99
Of somewhat broader scope is the National Labor Relations Board
ruling that it is an unfair labor practice for a trust fund and a union to
withhold benefit information from contributing employers. °° In National
Union of Hospitaland Health Care Employees, Sinai Hospital of Baltimore brought an action before the Board to compel two unions
(National and District) and the Trust Fund to disclose certain benefit
information for the purpose of negotiations. The record revealed that the
Trust's Fund Director and its Board Chairman were the respective union
presidents.
Prior to the 1978 negotiations, the hospital requested certain
information from the Fund Director which included the names of the
contributing employers, their gross payroll, the amounts contributed,
the number of employees covered, and the type of quality of benefits
provided. The hospital claimed that this data was necessary for it to
bargain intelligently and to prepare for coming negotiations. 10' When
the Fund Director refused to supply the information on the grounds of
confidentiality and costs, the hospital pursued the matter with letters to
the union presidents, requesting them "to instruct your agent (the Fund)
to furnish the data." 0 2 The Fund Director referred the hospital's request
to the Trustee Administrative Committee, which was divided on the
question: The Management Trustees voted in favor of supplying the
information, while the Union Trustees voted against it.
As the 1978 negotiations began, the hospitals asked both unions to
provide the information, and the unions responded that only the Fund
had such information. Meanwhile, the parties reached an agreement
which did not increase the hospital's contribution rate to the Fund. At the
hearing, an administrative law judge "found that the requested informa98. §4221(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1401(a)(l)(e).
99. Id.
100. National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, 248 NLRB 631, 103
L.R.R.M. at 1459 (1980).
101. Id. at 632, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1460.
102. Id.
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tion was relevant and necessary to enable the hospital to perform its
collective bargaining functions." 03 The NLRB agreed and found that the
unions had "failed to bargain collectively" with the hospital and had
violated §8(b)(3) of the NLRA.104 The Board stated that it was proper
for "union officials to also wear the hat of a fund trustee,"105 but it
asserted that this dual role was not to interfere with the trustees'
fiduciary purpose. The Fund Director/Union President "as a controlling benefits plan trustee utilized groundless reasons which were not
supportive of that purpose and which instead had the inevitable result of
permitting the Unions to evade their bargaining obligations with respect
to a matter ... which was primary to both the Hospital and respondent
Unions."' 0 6 Furthermore, the NLRB stated that the information requested by the hospital was necessary for bargaining, regardless of the
dual roles played by the Union President. On the issue of the Fund
Director/President's refusal to furnish the data, the Board stated:
And even if it had been made under his fiduciary hat, no reason has
been shown why this precludes the furnishing of the information...
Here, his action was inimical to the interests of the beneficiaries in
that it undermined the good-faith bargaining on which the employer
contributions providing the benefits depend. 107
Clearly, the parties' access to information is essential if negotiators
choose to assume the additional responsibilities of negotiating benefit
levels at the bargaining table. It also is evident that management will
continue to press for access to plan data because of their concern over
withdrawal liability. Since the results of negotiations on benefits and the
fund's outstanding liabilities can have a profound impact on the Fund's
participants, it may be difficult to avoid disclosure to the employers.

FIDUCIARY STATUS

Choosing to negotiate benefit levels at the bargaining table may
pose other fundamental legal questions for union and management representatives. As a result of the parties direct involvement with the plan,
103. Id., 103 L.R.R.M. at 1461.
104. Id. at 634, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1462
105. Id. at 633, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1461 "... there is nothing in either ERISA or the NLRA
to prohibit a person... from operating in separate spheres as a trustee and as a union official."
ERISA §408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. §1 108(c)(3) permits individuals to serve as Secton 302 trustees "in
addition to being an officer, employee, agent or other representative . . ." of a union or an
employer organization.
106. Id. at 633, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1461.
107. Id.
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they may become fiduciaries under ERISA's standards. ERISA defines
a fiduciary as follows:
[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii)he renders investment
advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with
respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any
authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan. 108
It has been noted that this definition applies "not to positions a person
may hold, but rather to the functions he may perform in exercising
control over the management of a plan or the disposition of its assets." 0 9
Indeed, the term fiduciary has been interpreted broadly by the
courts. One federal court has stated that:
Officials of a company which sponsors a plan are themselves
fiduciaries to the extent that they retain authority for selection and
retention of plan fiduciaries because, to that extent, they have
retained 'discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management' of the plan ...

Individuals within the corporation

who exercise the type of authority and control described in §3(21)(A)
of ERISA will themselves be fiduciaries with respect to the plan."10
The definition of fiduciary has been held to encompass attorneys as well
as plan advisors and consultants. I Even an arbitrator, in the view of the
Department of Labor, can be a fiduciary based on his/her decision with
2
respect to plan management.Y
As bargaining parties move away from simply negotiating contribution rates and begin to set benefit levels, they inevitably will exercise
108. §3(21),29 U.S.C. §1002(21).
109. Trudgeon, Recent Litigation Regarding Fiduciary Responsibility Under ERISA, 7
JOURNAL OF PENSION PLANNING AND COMPLIANCE 250, 251 (1981).
110. Id. at 251 quoting Marshall v. Dekeyser, 485 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Wisc. 1979).
I11.Id. at 252.
112. "The Department of Labor has taken the position that an arbitrator would be a plan
fiduciary if he/she performed any of the functions described in the statute which defines the
term fiduciary." International Union United Auto Workers & Local 656 & 985 v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., No. 81-1377 (6th Cir. slip. op. March 11, 1983). Dep't. of Labor Advisory Opinion
No. 79-86A advised the parties that when an arbitrator resolves a dispute regarding whether a
plan participant is entitled to pension benefits, he is acting as a fiduciary because a fiduciary's
duties include the payment of valid benefit claims and the disallowance of invalid claims.
But see contra,Advisory Opinion 78-14. "Arbitrator is not a fiduciary when he resolves an
issue concerning the employer's monthly contributions to the fund and has the authority to
decide on a contribution rate. The Department reasoned in 78-14 that the arbitrator did not
p-.rform any of the functions described in §3(21)(A) ERISA; viz., he had no authority to
manage or dispose of plan assets, to render investment advice or to assist in the administration
of the plan." Id.
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more direct control over the management and administration of the
plan's assets. These actions, in conclusion, may result in the court's
imposing fiduciary status on the parties.
MAINTENANCE OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RELATIONSHP

Another concern faced by employers who participate in multiemployer benefit plans, is that events which may be beyond their control
can trigger MPPAA's withdrawal liability provisions. For instance, a
change in a collective bargaining representative because of a decertification of an existing union can terminate a company's participation in a
multiemployer plan even though the employer may desire to maintain an
existing collective bargaining relationship. However, pursuant to the
NLRA, employers cannot interfere with their employees' free choice in
the selection of a bargaining agent.1t 3 If employees choose to change
their union representative or if the incumbent union is decertified, the
employer cannot act even though it may be faced with MPPAA's
withdrawal liability.114
Recently, though, an ameliorating factor has been introduced into
the situation. In 1982, the NLRB re-examined the law applicable to
instances wherein an incumbent union is challenged by an outside union
for purposes of representation."15 In November, 1974, the Company and
the incumbent union commenced negotiations for a new contract. The
union struck on January 9, 1975, through February 26, 1975. On
January 27, 1975, the union, Union Independiente (UI), filed a
representation petition with the Board. At first, RCA refused to
recognize or to negotiate with the IBEW due to the UI's petition.
However, on February 25, 1975, the Company agreed to resume
negotiations. On the following day, RCA and the IBEW executed a new
contract.
The NLRB's General Counsel argued that RCA violated the
requirement established in Midwest Piping' 6 that an employer must
113. §8(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1). This section provides: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in §7"; §7, 29 U.S.C. 157 grants employees the right "..
to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing,..."
114. In anticipation of such situations, MPPAA directs the PBGC (Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation) to "conduct a separate study with respect to ... the necessity of
adopting special rates in cases of union-mandated withdrawal from multiemployer pension
plans." Section 412(a)(1)(B) of MPPAA does not amend ERISA, but establishes requirements
for studies to be conducted by the PBGC.
115. RCA del Caribe, Inc., 262 NLRB No. 116, 110 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1982).
116. Midwest Piping and Supply Co., Inc., 63 NLRB 1060, 17 L.R.R.M. 40 (1945). The
"Midwest Piping Doctrine" stands for the proposition that an employer must maintain strict
neutrality when confronted with competing representational claims.
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maintain strict neutrality in the face of competing representational
claims. Specifically, the General Counsel claimed that the Company
rendered unlawful assistance to the IBEW in violation of §8(a)(1) and
118 in that the contract contained a
(2)117 and it further violated §8(a)(3)
union security clause. RCA argued that the filing of a representation
petition by the U1 did not raise a real question concerning representation.
The Board noted that it is impossible for an employer with an
existing collective bargaining relationship to observe strict neutrality. If
the employer chooses to bargain with the incumbent union, it will
exhibit favoritism towards that union. Conversely, the rival union will
gain favored status if the employer withdraws from negotiations with the
incumbent. 19 Accordingly, the Board overruled Shea ChemicalCorporation,120 which held that an employer faced with a pending petition from
an outside union must cease collective bargaining with the incumbent
and maintain a position of strict neutrality. The Board held that
the mere filing of a representation petition by an outside, challenging
union will no longer require or permit an employer to withdraw from
bargaining or executing a contract with an incumbent union. Under
this rule, an employer will not violate Section 8(a)(2) by post-petition
negotiations, or execution of a contract with an incumbent, but an
employer will violate section 8(a)(5) by withdrawing from bargaining
based solely on the fact that a petition has been filed by an outside
2
union.' '
Importantly, the Board emphasized that despite its ruling, it would
continue to process valid petitions timely filed by outside unions and to
conduct elections as expeditiously as possible.
117. Section 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(2) makes it unlawful for an employer "to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it."
118. Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate against employees "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment" in order to encourage or discourage membership in a labor
union.
119. See Bruckner Nursing Home, 262 NLRB No. 115, 110 L.R.R.M. 1374 (1982). In this
companion case to RCA del Caribe,the Board modified the "Midwest Piping Doctrine" as it
applied to initial organizing situations involving rival unions. The Board held that ". . .the duty
of strict employer neutrality and the necessity for a Board-conducted election attach only when
a properly supported petition has been filed by one or more of the competing labor
organizations. Where no petition has been filed, an employer will be free to grant recognition to
a labor organization with an uncoerced majority, so long as it does not render unlawful
assistance of the type which would otherwise violate Section 8(a)(2) of the Act." Id. slip op. at
14, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1377, 1378.
120. 121 NLRB 1027,42 L.R.R.M. 1486 (1958).
121. 262 NLRB slip op. at 10-1I, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1371.
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Because of the combined effects of MPPAA's withdrawal liability
provisions and the Board's decision in RCA, labor union efforts to
organize where there is an incumbent union may meet insurmountable
barriers. The economic interests of an employer, after MPPAA, dictate
that the employer continue to bargain with an incumbent union where
an outside union files an election petition; and, if possible, reach an
agreement with the incumbent. Such a scenario would prevent the
termination of the the employer's participation in the plan; thus avoiding
the imposition of withdrawal liability. The only danger to the employer
is the possibility of an NLRA violation. It now appears that RCA has
effectively removed such a threat.
Where a change in the bargaining representative, however, does
occur, there are provisions in MPPAA designed to lessen the impact of
that change on the "withdrawing" employer. Section 4235 provides that
when an employer withdraws due to a certified change in the bargaining
representative, and the participants in the previous plan continue to
participate in a new multiemployer plan, the first plan shall transfer its
assets and liabilities to the new plan.122 In addition, the statute provides
for the reduction of a withdrawing employer's liability where there is
such a transfer of liabilities to another plan. The reduction in liability is
the amount equal to the "value ...of the transferred unfunded vested
benefits."' 23 Therefore, MPPAA does provide for the reduction of
withdrawal liability where there is a change in the bargaining representative, provided the conditions of §4235 are met.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION To AMEND

MPPAA

The results brought about since the passage of MPPAA have
prompted various employer organizations to draft legislation which
would amend the Act, specifically, in the area of withdrawal liability.
The most notable bills are the proposed "Multiemployer Pension Plan
Stabilizaton Act of 1981 "124 and the "Multiemployer Retirement Income
Protection Act of 1982."125
The stated purpose of S.1748 was to exempt certain fixed contribution multiemployer pension plans from Title IV of ERISA. The
proposed legislation would remove employers who have negotiated only
contribution rates in their collective bargaining agreements prior to
April 29, 1980, from the withdrawal and plan termination insurance
provisions of ERISA. The provisions of the Act still would apply to
122. §4235, 29 U.S.C. §1415(a).
123. §4211(e), 29 U.S.C. §1391(e).
124.

S.1748, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982).

125.

H.R. 7233, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982).
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employers who have negotiated benefit levels in their collective bargaining agreements. In effect, the bill was an attempt to alleviate the impact
of MPPAA's withdrawal liability rules by making employers responsible
only for terms to which they had agreed in their collective bargaining
agreements.
Similarly, the "Multiemployer Retirement Income Protection Act
of 1982" would amend ERISA's provisions on withdrawal liability
funding, premium rates, and asset sales. More importantly, this bill
would prevent poorly funded plans from increasing unfunded vested
benefits. Plans would not be permitted to increase unfunded vested
benefits "by providing for retrospective benefit increases or granting past
service credits, unless they have a 'vested benefits funding ratio' of .7 to
one or better."1 26 The requirement of a .7 ratio would apply for five years
following the bill's enactment and after that period, the ratio would
change to .9 to one. 127 These special rules on funding ratios are
particularly significant in light of the previous discussion on the trustees'
duties and the potential changes in the bargaining with respect to benefit
increases. If H.R. 7233 were to be enacted, the authority of both the
trustees and the bargaining representatives to grant benefit increases
would be limited if the plan did not have the requisite funding ratio.
Whether any amendment to MPPAA will be enacted is difficult to
predict. However, the extensive support for major revision of the statute
is strong evidence of the fact that MPPAA has engendered many problems and has created many doubts about the wisdom of its provisions.
CONCLUSION

This article has concentrated on examining the effects of MPPAA's
withdrawal liability provisions on the ability of trustees to set benefit
levels and to make investment decisions, as well as the changes that are
occurring between the parties to collective bargaining agreements both
during the term of the agreement and at the time of negotiations.
Events subsequent to MPPAA's enactment reveal that it is much
more difficult today to persuade employers to agree to increases in
benefit levels than it was prior to MPPAA. Divisions between the
employer and union trustees are occurring more frequently, and existing
conflicts between the parties to the collective bargaining agreement have
been fueled by MPPAA. Perhaps, the most unfortunate of MPPAA's
effects is that it has made multiemployer defined benefit plans unattractive to employers. Therefore, it is more difficult for unions to attract new
employers as contributors to such plans. Similarly, employers are propos126. BPR No. 414, at 1409 (Oct. I1, 1982).
127. The funding ratio is the ratio of a plan's assets to its vested benefits.
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ing to terminate well-funded defined benefit plans in favor of the establishment of defined contribution plans-thus avoiding MPPAA coverage. Ultimately, the participants will be the penalized parties because the
security of their benefits is guaranteed, in the final analysis, only by the
continued expansion of the plan's contribution base.
Finally, by encouraging disagreements and divisions between unions
and employers, MPPAA does not result in the furthering of industrial
peace which has always been the cornerstone of labor legislation. Many
of these developments were anticipated prior to the Act's passage, and
much concern was voiced at that time. Unfortunately, many of the
predictions have proven correct. Congress, in its attempt to protect and
to preserve multiemployer plans, may have sown the seeds for their
eventual destruction.
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